Summary. This is the second of a series of papers on the theory of acceptable points in ^-person games. The first was [1] ; in it the notion of acceptable points was defined for cooperative games, and a fundamental theorem was proved relating the acceptable expected payoffs for a single play of a game to probable average payoffs for ' 'strong equilibrium points" in its supergame. 1 The chief result of the current paper, Theorem 5.4, is a generalization of von Neumann's classical Theorem on two-person zero-sum games of perfect information (see [11] ). Roughly, it states that strong equilibrium points in the supergame of a stable game of perfect information can be achieved in pure supergame strategies. An example shows that not all games possess this property; and in fact, it is conjectured that the property is characteristic of game structures of perfect information.
The theorem stated above holds whether G is interpreted as a cooperative or as a non-cooperative game. To lend meaning to this statement, we will have to extend the theory introduced in [1] to non-cooperative games. We plan to do this in full in a subsequent paper. Here just enough definitions and theorems will be used to enable us to state and prove the chief result for non-cooperative games of perfect information.
The paper is divided into two parts, the first centering around the proof of the chief result for cooperative games, the second dealing with the extension to non-cooperative games. Section 1, the introduction, serves mainly to supply background from [1] and from the literature. In § 2, we show that the naive approach to generalizing von Neumann's theorem on games of perfect information fails; that is, we bring an example of a stable game of perfect information that has no acceptable point in pure strategies. It is then shown intuitively that an appropriate generalization of the von Neumann Theorem should involve the supergame. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the proof of preliminary theorems, dealing with supergame pure strategies and supergames of perfect information, respectively. In § 5 we establish the chief result. Section 6, which completes the first part of the paper, is devoted to the example and conjecture mentioned in connection with the chief result.
l Introduction and background* Up to the present, the starting point for all work on games of perfect information has been the theorem of von Neumann that every two-person zero-sum game of perfect information with finitely many moves has a solution in pure strategies. Subsequent work has dealt with extensions to ^-person games and the concomitant generalizations of the solution notion, with various converses to the von Neumann theorem, with extensions to games containing infinitely many moves (i. e., positions), and with various combinations of these. We mention also the notion of stochastic games of perfect information with infinitely many moves.
In the first of these areas, Kuhn [9] showed that the von Neumann theorem could be extended to w-person games if the "equilibrium point'' notion of Nash [12] was substituted for the classical solution notion. Dalkey [4] proved a converse of this theorem, which reduces to a converse of the von Neumann theorem in the two-person, zero-sum case. Gale and Stewart [6] were the first to treat games of perfect information with infinitely many moves; they showed that certain such (twoperson zero-sum) games possess no pure strategy solutions, and derived sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy solution. Wolfe [14] extended their results. By adopting a definition of payoff that is somewhat more restricted than that of Gale and Stewart, Berge [2] was able to extend von Neumann's theorem to some games with infinitely
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'όS'ό many moves. He was also able to show [2, 3] that under very general conditions on the structure of the game, Kuhn's theorem on the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium point in a game of perfect information holds true. The work of Shapley [13] and Gillette [7] on Stochastic Games of perfect information will be discussed in detail below.
The current paper deals with an extension of the von Neumann theorem to n-person games. The solution notion that we use is that of "acceptable" points, introduced in [1] . The notion of acceptability is a generalization of the "core" introduced by Gillies [8] for the cooperative game with side payments. More precisely, an w-tuple x of strategies is called acceptable if the players of any given coalition can be prevented by the players not in that coalition from each obtaining a higher payoff than when x is played (Definition 4.1 of [1] ). Intuitively, it would seem that in a long sequence of plays of a game, a "steady state" would have to represent an acceptable point, because the players would certainly tend to move away from any point that is not acceptable.
In order to obtain a precise statement and proof of this intuitive idea, we introduced (in §6 of [1] ) the formal notion of the "supergame" of a given game G. The super game of G is a game each play of which consists of an infinite sequence of plays of G. The payoff to a superplay (i.e., a play of the supergame) is given by the average (i.e., first cesaro limit, if it exists) of the payoffs to the individual plays of G that constitute the superplay. Many of the notions that apply to ordinary games can also be applied to supergames. In particular, it is possible to define the notion of strategy in the supergame, and also the notion of a strategy equilibrium point in the sense of Nash. A much stronger form of the Nash equilibrium notion may be defined as follows: An %-tuple x of strategies is called a "strong equilibrium point" if for no coalition B can all the members of B increase their payoff by adopting strategies different from those at x while the remaining players (those in N -B) play as they did at x. The notion of strong equilibrium applied to the supergame provides a formalization of the "steady state" idea ( §7 of [1] ).
The basic result of [1] ( § 10) may be stated as follows: The payoffs for the acceptable points in a game G are the same as the payoffs for the strong equilibrium points in its supergame. Since the notion of acceptability depends only on the payoff, this means that the acceptable points in G correspond precisely to the steady state points in the supergame of G. For two-person zero-sum games, a point is acceptable if and only if its payoff is the game value, whereas it is a strong equilibrium point if and only if it is a'solution ( §5 of [1] ).
The object of this paper is to apply the theory of acceptable points to games of perfect information, with a view to obtaining an appropriate w-person generalization of the von Neumann theorem. In other words, we want to accomplish for acceptable points in games of perfect information what Kuhn did in [9] for equilibrium points in games of perfect information. The first conjecture in this direction might be that every game of perfect information has an acceptable point in pure strategies. This is unreasonable, because according to an example given in [1] ( §11), not every game of perfect information need have an acceptable point at all, let alone one in pure strategies. However, it turns out that not even all stable games (games that do have acceptable points) of perfect information have pure strategy acceptable points. The reasons for this are discussed in § 2, and it is also shown there that a more appropriate place to look for a generalization of the von Neumann theorem is in the supergame. We would like to show that if G is a game of perfect information, then each player can restrict himself to pure strategies in each play of an infinite sequence of plays of G. In fact, we prove (Theorem 5.4) that every acceptable point (and hence every strong equilibrium point) in a game of perfect information can be "achieved" in pure supergame strategies, in the sense that there is a pure strategy strong equilibrium point with the same payoff. In particular, if the supergame of a game of perfect information has a strong equilibrium point at all, then it already has one in pure strategies.
Formally, the supergame defined in [1] bears some resemblance to the stochastic games treated by Gillette in [7] . The two concepts are similar in that both involve games consisting of an infinite sequence of plays of finite games, and the payoffs in both cases are given by a form of the average of the payoffs to the individual plays. The main differences are that Gillette considers a set of M games, any one of which may be the game played at a given stage, whereas we are concerned with repeated plays of one game only; and that Gillette considers twoperson zero-sum games, while we deal with ^-person games. The "intersection" of the two theories is an infinite sequence of plays of the same two-person zero-sum game of perfect information, a trivial situation once von Neumann's theorem is known (obviously both players play their optimal pure strategies on each play). The two theories provide totally "disjoint" generalizations of the von Neumann theorem.
All of Gillette's positive results involve "stationary" strategies, i.e., supergame strategies that are obtained by repeating the same strategy on each play of the infinite sequence of plays that constitutes a superplay. In a somewhat similar situation, Everett [5] gives a formal definition of some strategies that are not stationary, and obtains positive results with them; but the strategies he defines are still "almost" stationary in the sense that the choice of a player at a given game of the supergame can depend only on which game he is at, not on the choices of the other players on previous occasions.
It is of interest to ask whether these restricted notions of strategy are sufficient for our theory. The answer is no. The existence of a strong equilibrium point in stationary pure strategies would imply the existence of an acceptable point in pure strategies; and the example in § 2 shows that even in stable games of perfect information such an acceptable point in pure strategies need not always exist. The same example shows that there is no strong equilibrium point in "almost" stationary pure strategies. Finally, we mention that in the supergames of games of perfect information (even unstable ones), there is always a Nash equilibrium point (as opposed to a strong equilibrium point) in stationary pure strategies. This is a consequence of Kuhn's theorem.
2 Failure of the naive approach* We saw in [1] ( §5) that the concept of acceptability constitutes a generalization of the concept of solution in two-person, zero-sum games. As a generalization of Von Neumann's Theorem on two-person zero-sum games of perfect information, we might hope that every game of perfect information that has any acceptable points also has acceptable points in pure strategies. An example shows that this is false.
The game G is a two-person, non-zero-sum game of perfect information. In the game tree, given in Figure 1 , the moves are labelled with the names of the players and the terminals with the payoff vectors.
1 Figure 1 (6,0) (0,6) (2,1)
Each player has two strategies, the left and the right strategies. Notation in the following payoff matrix is obvious. The intuitive feeling that a game of perfect information should have a "good" point in pure strategies can be traced to the traditional purpose of mixed strategies-namely, to hide one's intensions from one's opponent by the use of a random device. In a game of perfect information, we somehow feel that it is unnessary to hide one's intensions, that it is in the nature of the game that everything may just as well be open and above-board. The conclusion is that mixed strategies are unnecessary in such a game, and that therefore we may just as well confine ourselves to the consideration of pure strategies.
The counter example points up the fallacy in this intuitive argument. It is quite true that the hiding of one's intentions, and the concommitant use of a random device should be unnecessary in a game of perfect information. This does not mean, though, that one can achieve one's desires by means of pure strategies. Indeed, if there were some means of mixing one's strategies other than by the use of a random device, this would be perfectly satisfactory in Example 3. For example, the pair (L\ 1/2L 2 + l/2i?
2 ) happens to be acceptable. If, instead of tossing a coin before each play of a sequence of plays, 2 were to announce beforehand that he will alternate L 2 and R\ this would in no way affect the actions of 1. Contrary to the situation in, say, penny matching, the purpose of playing 1/2L 1 + 1/2R 1 here is simply to achieve a payoff not provided in the matrix, not to avoid "discovery" by the opponent.
This discussion shows that though we cannot expect pure-strategy acceptable points in a game G of perfect information, we should be able to expect that the players may, without loss, restrict themselves to pure strategies in each of the plays that constitute a superplay of G. This is in fact the case, as we shall see in the sequel.
3 Supergame pure strategies* A supergame pure strategy vector (or p-strategy vector) is a c-strategy vector in which there are no coalitions and the players choose pure strategies on each play. Here the second condition is the essential one; the first condition is adopted only for convenience. If the first condition were eliminated, the resulting supergame strategy vectors would be essentially equivalent to those obtained under our definition.
The formal definition is as follows: We also say that f ι is a supergame p-strategy. The following are lemmas that will be needed later. LEMMA 
If f is a supergame p-strategy vector and B is a (possibly empty) subset of N, then for each k >
Furthermore, for each k>l, we have
Proof. The first statement follows at once from 3.1. The second statement follows by induction from 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 of [1] , and from 3.1. 
Proof. The first statement is an immediate consequence of the previous lemma. As for the second statement, it follows from the first statement that
But by Definition 6.1 of [1] , f*~B is independent of (v?, --,v B k ). The result follows at once.
For a supergame c-strategy vector /, define
Parallel to the definition of strong equilibrium c-point, we may make the following definition: The set of all strong equilibrium ^-points is denoted by S p . The Condition 3.7 may also be replaced by the following condition:
We denote by S p the set of supergame p-strategy vectors that satisfy a condition that differs from 3.5 only in that 3.7 is replaced by 3.8.
The essential difference between a strong equilibrium p-point and a pure strong equilibrium c-point is that in the former, N -B need only be prepared to defend against all supergame pure strategy 5-vectors, whereas in the latter, N -B must be prepared to defend against all supergame correlated strategy B-vectors. We will show in 3.11 that the two conditions are nevertheless equivalent. As for 3.7 and 3.8, they are merely translations of 7.2 and 7.3 of [1] to the case of pure strategies, where the consideration of probabilities becomes superfluous. THEOREM 3.9. If f is a supergame p-strategy vector, then z k (f), #*(/)> cmd E k (f) are "pure" for each k > 0; that is, they are discrete probability distributions in which one of the events occurs with probability 1, all others with probability 0.
Proof. This is a trivial consequence of (6.2), (6. 3), (6.4) , (6.5) and (6.6) of [1] , and of 3.1.
Theorem 3.9 enables us to replace probability statements involving the random variable S k (v) Proof. We consider first the converse, the easier of the two statements. Let / be a pure strong equilibrium c-point. It is sufficient to prove that there is no pure g satisfying 3.6 and 3.7. Suppose there is such a g. Then g must satisfy 7.1 of [1] , which is identical with 3.6. Furthermore, from 3.7 we deduce the existence of an ε > 0 such that for infinitely many k, we have
It follows that for infinitely many fc, we have
where e B is a 5-vector defined by
for all i e B. Hence it follows that for all k, we have
Applying 3.10, we obtain
But this is exactly Condition 7.2 of [1] . We have established that g satisfies 7.1 and 7.2 of [1] , whence / cannot be a strong equilibrium c-point. This contradicts the hypothesis, and we must conclude that g satisfies 3.6 and 3.7. This completes the proof of the converse. Now assume that / is a strong equilibrium p-point, but not a strong equilibrium c-point. Then there is a supergame c-strategy vector g satisfying 7.1 and 7.2 of [1] . From 7.1 of [lj we obtain From 7.2 of [1] , we obtain that there is a B-vector ε B > 0 for which
Now the expression inside the limit on the left side of (2) is monotone decreasing with k; hence (2) implies the existence of a
From (4) we obtain
which is the same as
That (5) follows from (4) is an immediate consequence of the fact that the measure of the intersection of a monotone decreasing sequence of measurable sets is the limit (or g.l.b.) of the measures of the sets.
From (3) and (6) it follows that there is a sequence
occurring with positive probability when g is played, for which
for infinitely many r .
Since v occurs with positive probability we deduce from 6.4 and 6.2 of [1] , and from the definitions in §2 of [1] that for each k,
It follows that for each fc, there is a p k satisfying
Now as a consequence of 2.7 of [1] , Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, and (1), we have that for each k > 0,
From (9) it follows that
Applying (10), we deduce that
and it then follows from (1) that
Since fξ~B must be a pure strategy (N -J3)-vector, it follows from (11) that (12) /^(Vx, •• ,v*) = Pf« 1> .
We now define a supergame p-strategy vector q by (13) q"-B = /*-* (14) ίi_i = ί>i , ΐ e B, fc > 1 .
Next, we prove that for k > 1,
follows at once from (13), (14) and the fact that / is a supergame p-strategy vector. The remainder of (15) is proved by induction on k.
For k = 1, we have by 6.2 and 6.3 of [1] ,
) (by (13) and (14)) (17) -u(c( Pl )) (by (12)
Now let us assume that we have established
Then by 6.2 and 6.4 of [1] , , u(c(q,(y) 
))) .
By (16) and (18), all the coefficients z k (q)(y) in this sum vanish, unless
Now by (14),
and by (10), = Pΐ + r (by (12)) .
Combining (20) and (21), we obtain q k (z k {q)) = p k+1 . Hence c{q*{z k (q))) = P*+i , and it follows from this and (8) that
Combining (19) and (22), we obtain
which completes the inductive step and the proof of (15). Hence (22) holds for all k, and therefore H(c(q,(zM) )) (by 6.6 and 6.7 of 11])
It then follows from 6.11 of [1] and from 3.4 that
SM = SJv) .
Applying (7), we obtain that 
fc-*oo iEB iSB
Now by (13) and (14), q is a supergame p-strategy vector. By (1) it satisfies 3.6 and by (23) Proof. The necessity follows at once from 6.9 of [1] , For sufficiency, we must show that if / is summable in the mean, then a sequence of random variables distributed according to E k (f) obeys the strong law of large numbers. But this follows at once from 3.9.
4* Supergame pure strategies in. games of perfect information• In a game G of perfect information, the information that a player i has about the outcome of each previous play 2 may be described as follows, (4.1) He knows which terminal was reached. (4.2) He knows which pure strategy he himself played.
Formally, let W be the set of terminals in G, and let λ:P-> W be the function that associates with each pure strategy vector p the terminal λ(p) that results when p is played (in the notation of [9] , if πeP, λ(π) is the unique weW for which p π (w) = 1). Then for each i e B and p e P,
If he wishes, the reader may regard 4.3 as the definition of u ι for games of perfect information.
Actually, each player may with impunity discard the additional information obtained from 4.2 as long as he restricts himself to the use of supergame p-strategies. Formally, we may say that in a game of perfect information, each supergame p-strategy /* is equivalent to one 
For convenience, we will sometimes make use of the following conventions: CONVENTION Let θ N~ι be an arbitrary supergame p-strategy (N -i)-vector. We prove by induction on k that
For & = 1, (3) follows at once from (1) and 6.3 of [1] , Suppose (3) has been proved for k < j. Set (5)). This completes the induction and the proof of (3). Applying 6.6 and 6.7 of [11 to (3), we obtain
= /S((»i(f) I ^ 9l), (^(ξ) ITΓ, flfK^f))), , (xj(ξ) I ^, flfi-i(^-i(f)))) (by (2)) = /ί(0*i(f) I ^ ί/ί), fed) I ^ 9\(zi(S))), , («j(l) I ^ flf}-i(^-i(?)))) (by
Hence by 4.4, But g ι is by its definition a supergame p*-strategy, and thus our proof is completed.
Parallel to Definition 3.5, we may make the following definition: DEFINITION 
A strong equilibrium p*-point f is a summable supergame p*-strategy vector for which there is no B a N and super-
game p*-strategy vector g satisfying 3.6 and 3.7.
The set of all strong equilibrium p*-points is denoted by S p +. If 3.7 is replaced by 3.8, the resulting set of points is denoted by S p *.
If we can succeed in restricting our considerations to supergame p*-strategies then we will have considerably simplified our problem, because then the information available about previous plays is the same for all players (so that the information function may be regarded as 1-dimensional rather than ^-dimensional). That we may without loss of generality restrict ourselves in this way is the content of the next theorem. THEOREM 
In a game C of perfect information, a summable supergame p-strategy vector f is a strong equilibrium p-point if there
is a strong equilibrium p*-point /* equivalent to f.
Proof. Suppose fφS,.
Then there is a B c N and a supergame p-strategy vector g satisfying 3.6 and 3.7. In accordance with 4.9, there is a supergame p*-strategy i?-vector g% for which
By hypothesis we have
Combining (1), (2), (3), and 3.6, we obtain (4) </*-</.
From (4) (6), we obtain
From 3.7, (5), and (7) it follows that
From (2), (8), and 4.10 it follows that /* 0 S p+ , which contradicts the hypothesis. This completes the proof. COROLLARY 
H(S P *) c H(S P ).
Proof. Follows from 6.8 of [1], 4.5, and 4.11. The following theorems (4.13 through 4.16) will not be used in the sequel; they are included for the sake of completeness. The proofs use the same ideas as those already, given, and will be omitted. 
Here we are making use of the notation introduced in convention 4.7.
5* The main theorem* We make use of two lemmas. The first tells us that at an acceptable point in a game of perfect information, N -B can always retaliate for a defection by B by means of a single pure strategy. The second tells us that any payoff that can be obtained by a c-strategy vector in G can also be obtained by a supergame p-strategy vector (or even by a supergame p*-strategy vector). given by the inequalities
This ' "corner" is also convex. Applying the separation theorem for convex sets 3 , we obtain a hyperplane (6) and (7) are reversed, then we may obtain them in the given form by multiplying both sides of (4) by -1). From (3) and (7) it follows that (8) α*>0.
Since (4) defines a hyperplane, there must also be an i e B for which (9) α* Φ 0 . Define a two-person, zero-sum game G* as follows: There are two players, 1 and 2. The game tree of G* is the same as that of G, and G* is also a game of perfect information. Player 1 has all the moves that members of B have in C, and player 2 has all the moves that members of N -B have in G. Thus the mixed strategy space of player 1 is C B , and the mixed strategy space of player 2 is C N~B (we will also use the notation M 1 and M 2 for these mixed strategy spaces). The payoff in G* will be denoted by H*\ it is defined by Combining (12) with (6) (13) H\(m\, m%) < k .
By (11), G* is zero-sum as well as two person. (13) Combining (5), (14), and (15), we obtain
From (16) it follows that
Combining this with (8) and (9), we obtain for each c B e C B , the existence of at least one i e B for which
This completes the proof of the lemma.
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The next lemma tells us that the non-negative integers can be partitioned into disjoint subsets whose asymptotic densities will yield an arbitrary finite set of non-negative real numbers adding up to 1. 
(j) will also be denoted by π(j; y), and p π (k> z) by p(k; z\ y)
The proof is not difficult. It will be omitted. THEOREM 
In a game G of perfect information, H(A C ) c
Proof. In its main outlines, the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3 of [1] , which states that H(A C ) c H(S C ). The details, however, differ considerably in the two cases. Both proofs are divided into three parts: Given an acceptable payoff vector h, we must first find a sequence of strategy vectors which will yield a payoff of h in the supergame (under the assumption that the players are all "loyal"). Next, we must find a way to determine which players, if any, are disloyal; and finally, we must find a way to punish the disloyal players. All these elements must be incorporated into a supergame strategy vector. In Theorem 3 of [1] , the first of these tasks was accomplished by having the players play the same c-strategy vector on each play, namely the one that yields an expected payoff of h. Here this cannot be done, because the players must restrict themselves to pure strategies on each play. They must therefore play different pure strategy vectors on different plays in such a way so that the limiting payoff is h; to show that this can be done, use must be made of Lemma 5.2. As for the second task, this was accomplished in Theorem 3 of [1] by simply noting the make-up of the coalitions; here this cannot be done, because in supergame p*-strategy vectors, there are no coalitions. Instead, use must be made of the perfect information that each player has. Finally, a group B of disloyal players could be punished in Theorem 3 of [1] by use of the c-strategy (N -J5)-vector c N~B provided in the definition of acceptability; here only pure strategy (N -B) -vectors may be used, so that recourse must be had to Lemma 5.1. For a more detailed intuitive statement of the proof, see § 10 of [1] ,
We now give the detailed proof of 5.3. Let h e H(A C ), and suppose y N e A c is such that For each j > 1, let W ό be a copy of W. W 3 represents the set of possible outcomes of the jth. play. Let
Q k represents the set of possible outcomes for the first k plays, and as such is the domain of the function f{. Let g be any supergame p*-strategy vector in G. We define a compliance function a (v lf , v k ; g) for all (v 19 « ,^) € Q fc as follows:
For each member of Q fc , a tells which subset of iVhas been "loyal" to, or has complied with, the supergame ^-strategy vector g.
It is not difficult to see that for each g, we have
To show (4) , it is sufficient to show that N is the maximal set satisfying (3), i.e. that we have
But this follows at once from 4.19.
ACCEPTABLE POINTS IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION 403
Moreover, it follows from (3) that
We are now ready to define a strong equilibrium p*-point whose payoff is h. Set z k = «fc(/) for fc > 1. We first prove ( 7 ) Λ(Sfc) = π(ft; 7^) for fc > 0 .
For k > 0, (7) follows from (6) and (4); for k = 0, it follows from (6) and (5). Combining (7) with 4.20 and 4.21, we obtain H(π(r; y N ) ) (by (8) (*j-i(9) ) x ί") (by 3.6) = HfJ-i B (Xι(9) , , ^-i(ί/)) x P Λ ) (by 4.18) .
It now follows from (3) that
Combining (11) with (5), we obtain
From (10) we obtain the existence of a set B(g) c iV and a non-negative integer & 0 such that
Combining (12) and (13), we obtain
If B(g) = φ, then from (13) we obtain
whence, using (10), we deduce that
Using (3) and 4.18, we deduce from (15) that (16) x»(g) =; MΛ-ife-ito))) for k > 1 .
From (16) 
From 6.8 of [1], 3.4, and (17) it follows that which contradicts 3.6. Thus the assumption B(g) = φ has led to a contradiction, and we may conclude that
Combining (6), (13), and (18), we obtain
Let μ be the payoff function defined on W, so that
Our μ is what is called h in [3] ; it may also be defined by
where ψ is as in §6 of [1] . We then have
HM = H(EM) (by 4.21)
= ff(flr ϊ -1 (z,_ 1 (flr))) (by 4.20) (9) is some member of P mg) . Hence for k > k 0 , we have (20) and (19)) .
Hence for k > k 0 , we have by the linearity of H that
Applying (2), we obtain the existence of an i e B(g) such that
(24) H^y"-* 1 *, Σ* ~^ p^A -λ« < 0 .
Combining (23) and (24), we deduce that min ((τ Jl lΓ Σ Hίfo)) -A') <Ξ 0 from this and (14) Applying this to (25), we obtain that as fc -• co ,
Applying (9), we see that (26) contradicts 3.7. This completes the proof of 5.3. THEOREM 5.4 
. In a game G of perfect information, H(A C ) -H(S P ) = H(S P )
.
In particular, h is a c-acceptable payoff vector in G, if and only ij
there is a strong equilibrium c-point f in supergame pure strategies for which (1)) .
Hence equality must hold throughout, and we deduce (2) (1) and (2) yield the first part of 5.4. The second part follows at once from 3.11 and the first part.
COROLLARY 5.5. Every stable* game of perfect information has strong equilibrium c-points in super game pure strategies.
6. The converse of the main theorem. For two-person zero-sum games not involving chance, Von Neumann's theorem is known to "characterize" games of perfect information (see [4] ). More precisely, if Γ is a game structure of the above type which has the property that every game that can be obtained from Γ (by adjunction of a payoff function μ) has optimal pure strategies, then Γ must be equivalent to a game structure of perfect information. What can be said in this regard for the theory presented in the previous sections?
For one thing, it is of interest to know that there are some games that do not satisfy our main theorem (Theorem 5.4). Indeed, "matching pennies" is such a game. This game is given by JSΓ = (1,2) It is then easily seen that #i(ff) = 1 for k > 0 , whence it follows that
Combining this with (1), we see that g satisfies 3.7 for B = (1). By (2), <7 satisfies 3.6 for B = (1). Hence / cannot be a strong equilibrium ppoint.
The above example constitutes a formalization of the familiar argument that states that no "scheme" for playing a long sequence of pennymatchings that involves only pure strategies can be optimal.
The general statement of the converse would be as follows:
CONJECTURE. Let Γ be a game structure and suppose that every stable game that is obtained from Γ by adjunction of a payoff function μ has a strong equilibrium p-point. Then Γ is essentially equivalent (in the sense of [4] ) to a game structure of perfect information.
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There is little doubt in my mind that this conjecture is true, if not in the given form, then at least in some other closely allied form.
7. Notation for non-cooperative games We will make use of the notion of mixed strategies. Formally, the space M ι of mixed strategies of player i is defined to be identical with C\ If B is a subset of N, then we define
ten the cartesian product is meant. It follows that
the opposite inequality is generally false. The prefix m-is an abbreviation for "mixed". The definitions relating to payoff remain unchanged.
8* Acceptable points for non-cooperative games The non-cooperative game differs from the cooperative game chiefly in that the use of correlated strategy vectors that are not also mixed strategy vectors is forbidden. The definition of acceptability for non-cooperative games will therefore be the same as that for cooperative games (see [1] , section 4), except that correlated strategy vectors must be replaced throughout by mixed strategy vectors. The intuitive reasoning behind the definition remains unchanged. It might be objected that the "concerted action" that is necessary to prevent a set of players B from obtaining a payoff that is higher than at an acceptable point, is forbidden under non-cooperative rules. In fact, such concerted action will probably arise anyway as part of a "silent gentlemen's agreement" among the players of N -B. The only restriction is that though the players may "cooperate" in this sense (indeed, they cannot be prevented from so doing), they may not correlate their mixed strategies before a play.
Further intuitive discussion of the notion of m-acceptability will be found in a subsequent paper, devoted exclusively to acceptable points in non-cooperative games.
The formal definitions are as follows: The set of all m-acceptable m-strategy vectors is denoted by A m . Like c-acceptability m-acceptability is a "global" notion (see [1] , §4). We remark that as in the cooperative case, all two-person games have m-acceptable points. When we go beyond two-person games we find games that have no m-acceptable points. The example given in § 11 of [1] holds for the non-cooperative case as well, as does the intuitive discussion following the example. We remark also that even in the two-person case, there are games of perfect information that have no m-acceptable points in pure strategies. See § 2 of this paper, which applies unchanged in its entirety to the non-cooperative case.
9 Equivalence of Λf-acceptability and C-acceptabiUty in games of perfect information. 
H{C) c H(M) .
Instead of proving this, we will prove a more general version that we will need later. What we need for 9.1 follows from 9.2 if we set B = N. LEMMA In G if c B is a mixed strategy of player 0. Let /?* be its behavior (see [9] , §5, which will be called (*) in the sequel; Definition 16). Since Gi depends on i only because of its payoff, and since the behavior of a mixed strategy has nothing to do with the payoff, β* is independent of ί. Since G is of perfect information, so is G i9 and hence in particular, G t is of perfect recall. Noting that every pure strategy is also a behavior strategy, and in fact its own behavior, and applying Theorem 4 of (•), we obtain that for all p N~B e P N~B , If m* is the mixed strategy corresponding to /S 4 in accordance with Lemma 3 of (*), then it follows from Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 of (*) that for all p N ' B e P"-B , Combining (5) and (6), we obtain (1).
